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THE CREATION OF A SURPASSABLE WORLD: A 
REPLY TO DANIEL AND FRANCES HOWARD-SNYDER
Jihwan Yu
In this essay, I closely examine the role of the screening criterion in the 
Howard-Snyders’ thought experiment. Jove’s use of a screening criterion 
plays a crucial role in preserving his moral status. It allows him to take sig-
nificantly less moral risk in selecting a world for creation. It also helps him 
resolve the problem of moral luck in his favor. However, it is plausible that 
a highest screening criterion may not exist, and that for a given screening 
criterion, a higher one may exist. If this is the case, then Jove faces an infinite 
regress in selecting a screening criterion, making it impossible for him to use 
the randomizer.
Typically, contemporary theists assume that an omnipotent and omni-
scient being surveys possible worlds with different axiological properties 
and then selects one world for actualization. They also assume that the 
axiological properties of the possible worlds are comparable such that 
some possible worlds are better or worse than others. They disagree, 
however, on whether an unsurpassable world exists.1 Some believe that 
only one unsurpassable world exists. Leibniz, for instance, holds this view, 
arguing that God, due to his supreme wisdom and goodness, cannot but 
have chosen to create the unsurpassable world, which is the actual world. 
Others deny that only one unsurpassable world exists; they believe in-
stead that for any given world, a world exists that is trivially different 
from and yet as good as the original world. For example, a world that dif-
fers from the given world by having one more tree would be as good as the 
given world. They therefore believe that multiple unsurpassable worlds 
exist. Still others believe that an unsurpassable world does not exist (call 
this view NUW): for any given world, a better world always exists. They 
thus believe in the existence of an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better 
worlds.
In “How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World,” 
Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder assert that on NUW, an omnipotent, 
omniscient, and morally unsurpassable being could create a world inferior 
1For a discussion of different views, see Klaas Kraay, “Can God Choose a World at 
Random?” in New Waves in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Y. Nagasawa and E. Wielenberg (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 22–35.
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to some other world that it or another being could have created.2 To defend 
this assertion, the Howard-Snyders conduct a thought experiment in which 
Jove, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally good being, uses a random-
izer to select a world for creation. Jove first divides the possible worlds into 
acceptable and unacceptable ones; in acceptable worlds, every creature is 
at least as happy on the whole as it would have been in any other possible 
world, and no creature has a life so miserable on the whole that it would have 
been better for the creature had it never existed. Let us call this screening cri-
terion the “Adams World Criterion” and the possible worlds that satisfy this 
screening criterion “Adams Worlds.”3 Jove ranks Adams Worlds according 
to their goodness, assigning a positive natural number to each one: the worst 
world receives “1,” the second worst “2,” and so on. He then creates a device 
that, at the push of a button, randomly selects a number and produces the 
corresponding world. When he pushes the button, the randomizer selects 
World Number 777.
The Howard-Snyders then consider how other beings in Jove’s situa-
tion might create worlds. Juno, another omnipotent and omniscient being, 
uses the randomizer to create a world as Jove has. Her randomizer, how-
ever, selects World Number 999, a better world than Jove’s World Number 
777. The Howard-Snyders contend, however, that Juno is not morally su-
perior to Jove; neither Jove nor Juno have any control over which worlds 
their randomizers select. Therefore, the fact that Juno’s randomizer selects 
a better world by luck is not a good reason to infer that Juno is morally 
superior to Jove.
The Howard-Snyders also consider Thor, who does not use the random-
izer to select a world but chooses to create World Number 888. According 
to the Howard-Snyders, one cannot judge Thor as morally superior to Jove 
based solely on the qualities of the worlds that they have created.4 Given 
that Jove and Juno are morally equivalent, if Thor is morally superior to 
Jove, then Thor is also morally superior to Juno. Yet, Thor’s created world 
is inferior to Juno’s created world.
After comparing Jove with other beings, the Howard-Snyders conclude 
that Jove is not morally inferior. In other words, they conclude that on 
NUW, an omnipotent and omniscient being could create a world sur-
passed by some other world and yet be morally unsurpassable.5
2Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, “How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Sur-
passable World,” Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994), 260–268.
3The notion of an Adams World was introduced by Robert M. Adams, “Must God Create 
the Best?,” Philosophical Review 91 (2009), 317–332. He argues that if God creates an Adams 
World, no wrongdoing or unkindness towards creatures is involved in creation.
4Jeremy Gwiazda argues that the probability that Jove randomly selects a number less 
than or equal to 888 is infinitesimal, while the probability that he selects a number greater 
than 888 is certainty minus this infinitesimal. Since Jove is almost certain to select a larger 
number than Thor, Jove morally surpasses Thor. See Jeremy Gwiazda, “Remarks on Jove and 
Thor,” Faith and Philosophy 25 (2008), 79–86.
5Stephen Grover raises an interesting point that a less-than-omnipotent being named 
Freya can create a better world. Suppose Freya weeds out the unacceptable worlds and then 
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In this essay, I closely examine the role of the screening criterion in the 
Howard-Snyders’ thought experiment. Jove’s use of a screening criterion 
plays a crucial role in preserving his moral status. It allows him to take sig-
nificantly less moral risk in selecting a world for creation. It also resolves, 
in his favor, the problem of moral luck; such a problem arises when one 
correctly treats an agent as an object of moral judgment even though an 
important part of that judgment depends on factors beyond the agent’s 
control. And yet, although Jove’s use of the screening criterion plays an 
important role in preserving his moral status, it is doubtful whether he can 
choose a particular screening criterion. A highest screening criterion may 
not exist, and for a given screening criterion, there may be a higher one. If 
this is the case, then Jove faces an infinite regress in selecting a screening 
criterion: selecting a screening criterion turns out to be as problematic as 
selecting a world for creation. This fact makes it impossible for him to use 
the randomizer to choose a world for creation, undermining the coherence 
of the Howard-Snyders’ thought experiment.6
The Role of the Screening Criterion: Risk Reduction
Although Jove uses the Adams World Criterion to divide the possible 
worlds into acceptable and unacceptable ones, it is not the only screening 
criterion that he could have used.7 The Howard-Snyders suggest several 
other screening criteria:
a.  No world in which beings live lives that are not worth living is ac-
ceptable.
b.  No world in which beings experience gratuitous suffering is acceptable.
c.  No world in which beings live lives that are not as happy and ful-
filled as those lives could possibly be is acceptable.
d.  No world empty of sentient and rational beings is acceptable.
Screening criterion c seems to convey a standard similar to that of the 
Adams World Criterion. According to the Howard-Snyders, some of 
these screening criteria express higher standards than others. They say 
that screening criterion b, for example, is higher (i.e., more exclusive) than 
screening criterion a, for some worlds that would be unacceptable under 
screening criterion b would be acceptable under screening criterion a. For 
example, a world in which the inhabitants experience gratuitous suffering 
ranks the acceptable worlds in terms of their goodness and then creates the best world she is 
capable of creating, say, World Number 1000. This world is better than the worlds created by 
Jove, Juno, and Thor. See Stephen Grover, “This World, ‘Adams Worlds,’ and the Best of All 
Possible Worlds,” Religious Studies 39 (2003), 145–163.
6I note that Howard Sobel makes a similar point in his book. See J. Howard Sobel, Logic 
and Theism: Arguments for and against Beliefs in God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 476.
7Frances and Daniel Howard-Snyder, “The Real Problem of No Best World,” Faith and 
Philosophy 13 (1996), 424.
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as well as overwhelming joy would be acceptable under screening crite-
rion a, but not screening criterion b.
In comparison to other screening criteria, the Adams World Criterion 
allows Jove to take less moral risk. Consider, for instance, what would 
happen if Jove used a screening criterion that was much more lenient than 
the Adams World Criterion. Suppose that Jove uses screening criterion d, 
the most lenient of the four screening criteria. If he divides the possible 
worlds using this screening criterion, the randomizer can select among 
a wide range of worlds including, for example, a world in which the in-
habitants live mundane lives, a world in which the inhabitants are in dire 
need of food and shelter, or a world in which the inhabitants experience 
so much suffering that they prefer death to life.
On the other hand, the randomizer might not select any of these un-
desirable worlds; in fact, it might luckily select a world in which every 
inhabitant lives a happy life. If Jove were to use screening criterion d, how-
ever, he would be taking the risk of selecting an undesirable world. Jove 
is an omnipotent and omniscient being, so he can choose any screening 
criterion. And yet, taking such a risk would undermine his moral good-
ness, for one could ask: why would a morally unsurpassable being use 
screening criteria d and run the risk of creating an undesirable world 
when it could easily use the Adams World Criterion?
One might object that, even when he uses the Adams World Criterion, 
Jove cannot eliminate the risk of creating a less desirable world. Adams 
Worlds are ranked according to their goodness, the worst world receiving 
“1,” the second worst “2,” and so on. If the randomizer selects the number 
1, then Jove creates a world less desirable than any of the remaining worlds.
A reply to this objection is that Jove takes significantly less risk by using 
the Adams World Criterion, and that the degree of risk he takes matters 
when one assesses his moral goodness. Imagine the worst-case scenario 
with the use of the Adams World Criterion: the creation of World Number 
1. Although World Number 1 is the least desirable of all the Adams Worlds, 
it is nonetheless an Adams World—a world in which everyone is at least 
as happy on the whole as he would have been in any other possible world, 
and in which no one has a life so miserable on the whole that it would 
have been better for him had he never existed. Compare World Number 
1 with a world that could be created if Jove used screening criterion d—a 
world in which the inhabitants experience so much suffering that they 
prefer death to life. By using the Adams World Criterion, Jove takes no 
risk of creating such a world and guarantees the creation of a world ac-
ceptable to the inhabitants. These considerations suggest that Jove’s use of 
the Adams World Criterion helps him protect his goodness by allowing 
him to take less moral risk.
The Role of the Screening Criterion: the Problem of Moral Luck
In addition to helping him protect his goodness, Jove’s use of the Adams 
World Criterion also helps him protect his moral status by resolving the 
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problem of moral luck in his favor.8 The problem of moral luck occurs 
when one correctly treats an agent as an object of moral judgment even 
though an important part of the moral judgment relies on factors beyond 
the agent’s control. In the paradigmatic case illustrating the problem of 
moral luck, two truck drivers forget to have their brakes checked and ex-
perience brake failure. In one case but not the other, a child runs in front of 
the truck and is killed. Since neither driver has control over the child’s run-
ning into the street, it appears that one should not blame the driver who 
runs over the child more than the one who did not. On the other hand, the 
driver who runs over the child is at least partly responsible for the child’s 
death, for he failed to have his brakes checked. So, the driver who runs 
over the child seems to deserve a harsher moral assessment.
One can frame the problem of moral luck as a conflict between two 
moral principles. One principle holds that an agent should be morally 
judged based on factors under the agent’s control. Let us call this the “Con-
trol Principle.”9 This principle implies that one should treat both drivers 
on equal moral terms; neither has control over the child’s running out. On 
the other hand, the “Moral Luck Principle” holds that an agent should 
be treated as an object of moral judgment even though an important part 
of the moral judgment depends on factors beyond the agent’s control. 
This principle implies that the driver who runs over the child deserves 
a harsher moral assessment. The Control Principle and the Moral Luck 
Principle thus point to conflicting moral judgments.
The problem of moral luck arises in the Howard-Snyders’ thought ex-
periment when they compare Jove and Juno. Both used randomizers to 
select worlds for creation and therefore did not have control over which 
worlds they would create. Yet their randomizers selected different out-
comes: Jove created World Number 777, while Juno created World Number 
999. The Moral Luck Principle implies that Jove deserves a harsher moral 
judgment because he created an inferior world. The Control Principle, on 
the other hand, implies that Jove and Juno deserve the same moral judg-
ment because they had no control over which worlds their randomizers 
would select.
The Howard-Snyders claim that Juno is not morally superior to Jove 
even though she created a better world. They write,
Factors outside of one’s control can make a difference to how much good 
one brings about without making a difference to how good one is. Jove has 
no control over what number his randomizer will deliver. Thus, given his re-
solve to let the device do its thing, it is not up to him which of the worlds to 
his right is actualized. And precisely the same can be said about Juno. Thus, 
8The problem of moral luck was introduced by Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) and Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979).
9This term is used in Dana K. Nelkin, “Moral Luck,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy, ed. E. Zalta (2008). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-luck/.
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even if a better world results from Juno’s using the device, that’s no reason 
to infer that she is morally better than Jove.10
This passage suggests that the Howard-Snyders resolve the problem of 
moral luck by rejecting the Moral Luck Principle and upholding the Con-
trol Principle. They believe that Jove should not receive moral blame for 
producing a worse outcome because he had no control over which world 
his randomizer would select.
It is debatable whether the Howard-Snyders’ solution to the problem is 
plausible. Philosophers have offered different solutions to the problem of 
moral luck. Some deny the existence of moral luck and explain away the 
appearance of moral luck.11 They argue, for example, that our differing 
treatment of the two truck drivers indicates how we are influenced by 
different epistemic situations. We do not know for certain the drivers’ 
mental states at the time of the accident. The fact that one driver and not 
the other runs over the child provides epistemic evidence that the first 
driver is more negligent than the second. Therefore, it is the availability 
of epistemic evidence that influences our differing moral judgments of the 
drivers. Other philosophers, in contrast, accept the existence of moral luck 
and reject the Control Principle.12 They might point, for instance, to our 
common practices of blaming people for their racist attitudes even though 
we do not believe that such people are in complete control of their at-
titudes; their upbringing, we reason, may have influenced their attitudes. 
These philosophers argue that these practices reveal our implicit rejection 
of the Control Principle.
Although philosophers take different approaches to the problem of 
moral luck, one can make an insightful observation about it: the severity 
of the consequence resulting from an agent’s action tends to influence 
one’s moral judgment of the agent’s action. Consider, again, the case of 
the two truck drivers. Suppose that instead of a child, a dog runs in front 
of each truck and is killed in one case, but not in the other. Killing a dog 
is not good, but it is not as severe in consequence as killing a child; most 
people would grant that a human life is more morally significant than a 
canine life. Given that the drivers do not have control over the dog’s run-
ning out, when the truck driver runs over a dog instead of a child, it is less 
difficult to accept that both drivers deserve the same moral assessment. A 
less severe consequence tends to bolster the Control Principle and weaken 
the Moral Luck Principle.
10Snyder and Snyder, “How an Unsurpassable Being can Create a Surpassable World,” 
263.
11For this perspective, see Norvin Richards, “Luck and Desert,” Mind 65 (1986), 198–206 
and Brian Rosebury, “Moral Responsibility and Moral Luck,” Philosophical Review 104 (1995), 
499–524.
12For this perspective, see Robert M. Adams, “Involuntary Sins,” Philosophical Review 94 
(1985), 3–31 and Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1997).
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Suppose, on the other hand, that five children run in front of each truck 
and are killed in one case, but not in the other. Killing five children creates 
a serious consequence; it takes away their future experiences, activities, 
and joys, and impacts the lives of those close to the children. Given the 
severity of the consequence, one is more inclined to blame the driver 
who ran over the children; one feels that the driver deserves a harsher 
moral judgment for failing to have his brakes checked. A more severe 
consequence tends to bolster the Moral Luck Principle and weaken the 
Control Principle.
One can make the same observation about the comparison between Jove 
and Juno. The Howard-Snyders claim that Juno is not morally superior to 
Jove because neither had control over which worlds their randomizers 
would select. Their claim sounds plausible in part because the difference 
between the worlds that Juno and Jove created is, relatively speaking, 
not great. Although Jove’s World Number 777 is worse than Juno’s World 
Number 999, both are Adams Worlds—worlds in which everyone is at 
least as happy on the whole as he would have been in any other possible 
world, and in which no one has a life so miserable on the whole that it 
would have been better for him had he never existed. Since the worlds 
that they created are good (or at least acceptable to most of the inhab-
itants), and given that Jove did not have control over which world his 
randomizer would select, one is hesitant to blame him for creating a worse 
world. In this case, the Control Principle seems more appealing than the 
Moral Luck Principle.
Suppose, however, that Jove’s randomizer selects a world in which the 
inhabitants experience so much suffering that they prefer death to life, 
whereas Juno’s randomizer selects one of the Adams Worlds. In this case, 
the Howard-Snyders’ claim sounds less plausible. The striking difference of 
consequences makes Jove appear more blameworthy than Juno. Jove is an 
omniscient and omnipotent being and yet has created a world of misery; it 
seems that he should bear some moral responsibility for the consequence. 
So in this case, the Moral Luck Principle appears more appealing.
These considerations suggest that Jove’s use of the Adams Criterion 
helps him protect his moral status by resolving the problem of moral luck 
in his favor. His use of the Adams Criterion prevents the creation of a 
world of misery and guarantees the creation of an Adams World. This 
fact bolsters the Control Principle and weakens the Moral Luck Principle, 
rendering support for the claim that Juno is not morally superior to Jove.
The Problem of Selecting a Screening Criterion
Up to this point, I have shown that Jove’s Adams World Criterion plays 
a crucial role in protecting his moral status. Yet questions naturally arise 
concerning his use of the screening criterion: Could he have used a higher 
(i.e., more exclusive) screening criterion? Does a highest screening crite-
rion exist? If so, must he use it in order to be morally unsurpassable?
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The Howard-Snyders believe that a highest screening criterion exists. 
They write, “But why suppose that for every such principle, there is a 
higher? It seems odd to say the least that there should be infinitely many 
such general principles. At least we see no reason to accept that there are.”13 
They also write, “It is not reasonable to believe that there are infinitely 
many principles [screening criteria].”14 The Howard-Snyders, however, do 
not seem to offer evidence for these assertions: they do not provide con-
vincing reasons to believe that a highest screening criterion exists.
Concerning these assertions, Klaas Kraay comments, “By themselves, 
these claims do not constitute an argument for (14) [a highest screening 
criterion exists].”15 According to Kraay, the Howard-Snyders’ reasons are 
dialectical rather than philosophical. Yet for a different reason, he also 
maintains that a highest screening criterion does not exist. Each screening 
criterion points to a certain property that, if instantiated, tends to make the 
resulting world good. He calls this property the “world-good-making prop-
erty,” or WGMP. Consider the screening criterion, “No world in which the 
inhabitants live lives that are not worth living is acceptable.” The WGMP 
of this screening criterion is the lives worth living. This WGMP, however, 
cannot be maximally instantiated in a given world. For any given number of 
lives worth living, one can imagine a greater number of lives worth living. 
Since there is no unsurpassably great number, no unsurpassable world 
based on this WGMP exists. Kraay believes that most plausible WGMPs 
are degreed properties: they are instantiated in degrees just as are the lives 
worth living. Therefore, a highest screening criterion does not exist.
Kraay’s argument, however, is not convincing. If a screening criterion’s 
WGMP is a degreed property, then it seems that a highest screening cri-
terion does not exist. Yet he does not clearly show what makes a WGMP 
plausible, why most plausible WGMPs are degreed properties, and why 
a plausible WGMP cannot be an all-or-nothing property instead of a de-
greed property. These are important and relevant questions, and yet he 
does not directly address them.
One can make a more convincing argument that a highest screening 
criterion does not exist: if one accepts NUW, then one is compelled to 
accept that a highest screening criterion does not exist.16 NUW assumes 
that the axiological properties of the possible worlds are comparable such 
that some possible worlds are better or worse than others. Many con-
temporary theistic philosophers share this view. They believe that God 
is unsurpassable in power, knowledge, and goodness, and is the creator 
and sustainer of the world. Before God creates the world, he surveys the 
13Snyder and Snyder, “The Real Problem of No Best World,” 424.
14Ibid.
15Klaas Kraay, “William L. Rowe’s A Priori Argument for Atheism,” Faith and Philosophy 
22 (2005), 220. 
16I do not have to prove that the screening criteria have hierarchical orders. The Howard-
Snyders assume this. So my argument still works against their view. 
225THE CREATION OF A SURPASSABLE WORLD
set of possible worlds and freely selects exactly one for actualization on 
the basis of its axiological property. Given that the possible worlds have 
axiological status, three views on the existence of an unsurpassable world 
emerge. One view holds that only one unsurpassable world exists; an-
other holds that multiple unsurpassable worlds exist; and the last holds 
that an unsurpassable world does not exist (i.e., NUW).
The Howard-Snyders’ thought experiment assumes that the possible 
worlds can be evaluated based on an axiological property. For example, 
Jove ranks the possible worlds according to their goodness, an axiological 
property: “Then he orders the right hand worlds according to their good-
ness and assigns to each a positive natural number, the worst of the lot 
receiving ‘1,’ the second worst ‘2,’ and so on.”17 Another passage confirms 
that an axiological property is the basis of how the possible worlds are 
evaluated: “Thor is not better qua rational agent than Jove since on this 
retelling of the story Thor selects world no. 888 not because of its goodness 
but because he simply prefers it, say, because it has simpler laws or lots of 
waterfalls and jagged peaks and he likes those things.”18
Those advocating NUW typically argue that since one can evaluate 
possible worlds based on an axiological property, one cannot maximally 
actualize in a given world whatever axiological property one chooses. 
Bruce Reichenbach, for example, argues that for any world exhibiting a 
particular axiological property, one can conceive of another world exhib-
iting a greater amount of the same axiological property.19 He writes,
What sorts of states of affairs are counted as the most beneficial or opitimif-
ic? Hedonism suggests states of affairs which produce pleasure; utilitarian-
ism suggests utility; eudaimonism, happiness. Other possibilities would in-
clude most virtue, moral goodness, or goodwill in the world. But no matter 
which of these be accepted, whether individually or in combination . . . one 
could imagine an infinite series of optimific states in which for any amount 
of optimific states of affairs n, one could conceive of n + 1 states of affairs, 
or considered qualitatively for any degree of optimificity in the world one 
could conceive of even more optimificity. . . . Thus there could be no best 
possible world, since for any world which we could name there would al-
ways be another which was more optimific.20
Reichenbach suggests several axiological properties by which one might 
evaluate the possible worlds: pleasure, utility, happiness, virtue, moral 
goodness, or goodwill. These are all degreed properties. Consider, for 
example, the property of pleasure. For any world where inhabitants expe-
rience a given level of pleasure, one can conceive of another world where 
the inhabitants experience a higher level of pleasure. Therefore, an unsur-
passable world with a highest level of pleasure does not exist.
17“How an Unsurpassable Being can Create a Surpassable World,” 260.
18Ibid., 265.
19Bruce Reichenbach, Evil and a Good God (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982).
20Ibid., 127–128.
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Since Jove bases his evaluation of a world for creation on an axiological 
property, it is only natural that he bases his screening criterion on an axiolog-
ical property as well. Jove uses the screening criterion as a means to choose 
an acceptable world for creation: using the screening criterion, he screens out 
unacceptable worlds before applying the randomizer. Whether or not a world 
is acceptable for creation, however, is also an axiological question. Consider, 
again, what the Howard-Snyders propose as Jove’s screening criteria:
a. No world in which beings live lives that are not worth living is ac-
ceptable.
b. No world in which beings experience gratuitous suffering is acceptable.
c. No world in which beings live lives that are not as happy and ful-
filled as those lives could possibly be is acceptable.
d. No world empty of sentient and rational beings is acceptable.
All of these screening criteria are based on axiological properties. Screening 
criterion a divides the possible worlds based on the lives that are worth 
living; screening criterion b, on the experience of gratuitous suffering; 
screening criterion c, on happiness; and screening criterion d, on the 
lives of sentient and rational beings. It is no accident that these screening 
criteria incorporate axiological properties. They all serve the purpose of 
screening out unacceptable worlds, and the question of whether or not a 
world is acceptable for creation is an axiological one.
The fact that a screening criterion is based on an axiological property 
leads to the conclusion that a highest screening criterion does not exist; 
the argument for NUW applies to the non-existence of a highest screening 
criterion. Since an axiological property is a degreed property, one cannot 
maximally actualize it in a given world. The possible worlds are evaluated 
based on an axiological property. Therefore, an unsurpassable world does 
not exist. Likewise, a highest screening criterion does not exist because a 
screening criterion is based on an axiological property; no matter what 
axiological property one uses to rank the possible screening criteria, a 
highest screening criterion does not exist.
One might object that this argument assumes that every axiological prop-
erty is a degreed property. This assumption, however, is refutable, for one 
can conceivably devise a screening criterion incorporating an all-or-nothing 
axiological property. It is not clear what such an axiological property is, 
but one might speculate that it would be like the property of being bald or 
pregnant. One is either bald or not bald, and there are, one might presume, 
no degrees of baldness. Likewise, one is either pregnant or not pregnant but 
cannot be half-pregnant. If one devises a screening criterion incorporating 
an all-or-nothing property, then this screening criterion would be supe-
rior to any other screening criterion not incorporating the same property. 
Obviously, in addition one needs to show that the screening criterion in-
corporating the all-or-nothing axiological property is higher than any other 
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screening criterion incorporating a degreed axiological property. To show 
this may not be an easy task. But assuming that one can accomplish it, one 
cannot completely rule out the possibility of a highest screening criterion.
This is an objection, however, that those accepting NUW cannot raise; 
the objection would undermine their own view. If an all-or-nothing 
axiological property exists such that one can devise a screening criterion 
incorporating it, then one might as well use that same axiological property 
to rank the possible worlds. It is implausible to believe that one can use 
an all-or-nothing axiological property to devise a screening criterion, but 
cannot use the same property to evaluate a world. It seems completely 
arbitrary to say that an axiological property is appropriate for evaluating 
the possible screening criteria but not for evaluating the possible worlds, 
and the axiological property happens to be an all-or-nothing property. If 
one uses an all-or-nothing axiological property to evaluate the possible 
worlds, then the world where the property is actualized could qualify as 
unsurpassable. These considerations suggest that one cannot argue for 
the use of an all-or-nothing axiological property as a screening criterion 
without undermining NUW.
The issue of whether a highest screening criterion exists has an impor-
tant implication for the Howard-Snyders’ thought experiment. The fact 
that a highest screening criterion does not exist would crucially under-
mine the coherence of that thought experiment. Call the view NUS or “no 
unsurpassable screening criterion,” which holds that a highest screening 
criterion does not exist and that a higher screening criterion always exists 
for any given screening criterion. On NUS, Jove must choose a screening 
criterion before using the randomizer. In order to use the randomizer, 
he must assign natural numbers to the possible worlds. And in order to 
assign natural numbers to the possible worlds, he needs a screening crite-
rion to fix the World Number 1 mark. How would Jove choose a screening 
criterion on NUS?
The Howard-Snyders advocate the use of a randomizer on NUW. If 
they are right, consistency requires that they should do the same on NUS. 
Although NUW involves the possible worlds and NUS involves the pos-
sible screening criteria, they share important similarities: they concern an 
infinite number of components; they represent hierarchies of increasingly 
better standards; and how one chooses a particular component affects his 
or her moral status. These similarities suggest that the same argument for 
the use of randomizer on NUW should apply to NUS.
What alternative action could Jove take on NUS? It appears that, as in 
the Howard-Snyders’ thought experiment, he has three available options. 
He could decide to do nothing, in which case no world would be cre-
ated. He could use the randomizer which may happen to select a higher 
screening criterion. Lastly, he could decide to select a higher screening cri-
terion without using the randomizer. According to the Howard-Snyders’ 
view, however, Jove would not be morally superior by virtue of taking any 
of these actions.
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On NUS, however, a problem arises with Jove’s use of a randomizer. 
He needs a secondary screening criterion to choose a screening criterion. 
In order to use the randomizer, he must assign natural numbers to the 
possible screening criteria. And in order to assign natural numbers to 
the possible screening criteria, he needs a secondary screening criterion 
to fix the Screening Criterion Number 1 mark. The use of a screening 
criterion is indispensable whether Jove numbers the possible worlds or 
the possible screening criteria.
But Jove then encounters an infinite regress: he must use the randomizer 
once again to select a secondary screening criterion. A screening criterion 
screens out unacceptable possible worlds, while a secondary criterion 
screens out unacceptable screening criteria. Since whether a screening 
criterion is acceptable is an axiological question, the same argument for 
the non-existence of a highest screening criterion should apply to the non-
existence of a highest secondary screening criterion.
A close examination of the Howard-Snyders’ thought experiment thus 
reveals that whether Jove can use the randomizer to select a world for cre-
ation depends on whether a highest screening criterion exists. On NUW, 
it is plausible that a highest screening criterion does not exist; if one ac-
cepts NUW, then one is compelled to accept NUS. On NUS, however, Jove 
needs a secondary screening criterion to select a screening criterion. Jove 
thereby faces an infinite regress in selecting a screening criterion, making 
it impossible for him to use the randomizer to select a world for creation.
Conclusion
I have argued that Jove’s use of the screening criterion plays an important 
role in preserving his moral status. It allows him to take significantly less 
moral risk in selecting a world for creation. It also helps him resolve the 
problem of moral luck in his favor by bolstering the Control Principle and 
weakening the Moral Luck Principle.
Although Jove’s use of the screening criterion plays an important role 
in preserving his moral status, it is doubtful whether Jove can choose a 
particular screening criterion before using the randomizer. The Howard-
Snyders assert that a highest screening criterion does not exist, but they 
do not offer good reason for their assertion. I have argued that if one ac-
cepts NUW, then one is forced to accept NUS, because the possible worlds 
and the possible screening criteria are evaluated based on axiological 
properties. On NUS, however, Jove faces an infinite regress in choosing 
a screening criterion since he needs a secondary screening criterion to 
choose a screening criterion: selecting a screening criterion turns out to be 
as problematic as selecting a world for creation. This fact makes it impos-
sible for him to use the randomizer to select a world for creation, critically 
undermining the coherence of the Howard-Snyders’ thought experiment.
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